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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-
102(3)0). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to follow the precedent of 
Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 122 P.3d 521, 2005 UT 4 (Utah 2005). 
This issue was preserved for appeal in various pleadings submitted to the trial 
court and in oral argument. (R. 381—83, Trial Transcript, hereafter "Tr." 911-16). 
The standard of review for this issue is "correctness". 
2. Whether Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994), 
fails to provide an appropriate analytical framework under which a court can determine 
whether city council action is administrative or legislative in nature. 
This trial was all about application of the Marakis factors to the referendum 
sought by Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. and Jim F. Lundberg. On this issue 
appellants ask that the Court revisit the analytical framework which it adopted in 
Marakis. 
3. Whether the trial court erred in its conclusion that under the four-part 
analysis set forth in Marakis, the general purpose and policy of the newly enacted PD-2 
zone in Mapleton City fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1 
zone, such that creation of that new zone classification constitutes an administrative 
rather than a legislative function of the Mapleton City Council and thus is not referable. 
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This issue was preserved for appeal throughout the course of the six days of trial, 
in the pretrial and post-trial briefing and at closing arguments. Representative of this is 
the post-trial memorandum. (R. 371-81). 
Appellants attack certain of the court's factual findings, which factual findings 
will only be overturned if they are clearly erroneous. The trial court's application of the 
law to those facts is evaluated on a "correctness" standard. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
1. Article V I, § 1 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in: 
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2). 
(2)(b) The legal voters of any county, city, or town, in the numbers, under 
the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided by statute, may: 
(ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of 
the county, city, or town to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided 
by statute, before the law or ordinance may take effect. 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 20A-7-601, et seq. 
3. Mapleton Municipal Ordinances : 
a. Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element, adopted by Ordinance 2007-
21 (Add. 16). 
b. Mapleton City General Plan 2007 Map, adopted by Ordinance 2007-21 (Add. 
20). 
c. Mapleton Municipal Code, Chapter 180.30, CE-1 Critical Environment Zone 
(Add. 21). 
d. Mapleton Municipal Code, Chapter 180.78 PD Planned Development Zones 
(Add. 81). 
e. Ordinance 2007-17, PD-2 Zone Ordinance (Add. 39). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a decision by the Honorable Darold J. McDade in which he 
concluded that the general purpose and policy of a newly enacted zoning classification, 
the PD-2 zone, fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1 zone. 
Judge McDade concluded that the adoption of the PD-2 zone was an administrative act of 
the Mapleton City Council and thus not subject to appellants' proposed referendum 
petition by which appellants sought to have the adoption of the PD-2 zone ordinance 
submitted to the voters of Mapleton City. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Appellants Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. and Jim F. Lundberg (collectively 
"Friends") filed a Verified Complaint on October 15, 2007, seeking a temporary 
restraining order and preliminary and permanent injunctions prohibiting Appellee Mapleton 
City ("Mapleton" or "City") from implementing a zoning change on certain real property 
(the "Gibby Property") owned by the Appellees/Intervenors (collectively "Gibby"). (R. 
597). Friends alleged that Mapleton's PD-2 zone, created as a site-specific zone 
expressly for the Gibby Property, was subject to a referendum vote of the citizens of 
Mapleton, and that until such vote occurred, Mapleton and Gibby were precluded from 
implementing the PD-2 zone or developing the Gibby Property pursuant to that zone 
classification. (R. 597-96). The only relief sought in the complaint was injunctive 
relief. (R. 596). On the morning of October 15, 2007, Judge Claudia Laycock issued a 
temporary restraining order against Mapleton. (R. 596). 
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On his motion Gibby was allowed to intervene in the proceedings as the Gibby 
Property was at issue. (R. 596). Thereafter he filed an answer to the complaint. 
Mapleton filed an answer and counterclaim seeking declaratory relief on the issues of 
whether the challenged ordinance is referable and whether Plaintiffs gathered a 
sufficient number of signatures to place the matter on the ballot. (R. 596). 
On Mapleton's motion, and after discussion among the parties and Court at an 
October 31, 2007, hearing, the parties stipulated that the preliminary injunction hearing 
and permanent injunction hearing/trial on the merits would be combined, and that the 
temporary restraining order issued on October 15, 2007, would remain in effect pending 
the conclusion of the trial. Thereafter the parties conducted expedited discovery. (R. 
596). 
Trial of the case started before Judge Fred Howard on November 21, 2007. (R. 
596). During the presentation of evidence Judge Howard became aware of a potential 
conflict of interest, disclosed it to the parties and counsel on the record, and, at 
Friends' request, recused himself. (R. 596). The case then was assigned to Division 
10, Judge Darold J. McDade. (R. 596). 
Judge McDade held five more days of trial on December 5, 7, 12, 13, and 14, 2007, 
and the parties stipulated that the testimony of Camille Brown, City Recorder, given on 
November 21 before Judge Howard's recusal, would be used in transcript form at trial. (R. 
595). The parties presented witnesses, exhibits, and legal briefs and written arguments 
to the Court. (R. 595). The Court heard oral arguments on January 18, 2008, (R. 595) and 
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issued its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on May 15, 2008. This 
appeal followed after the issuance of that Order. 
C. STATEMENT OF V \( TS 
Most of the trial court's findings of fact are not in dispute in this appeal, Friends 
here sets forth those facts which they do not dispute, all of which are contained in the 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact: 
1. Friends of Maple Mountain, Inc. is a Utah not for profit corporation located 
in Utah County, Utah. Jim Lundberg is an individual residing in Mapleton City, Utah 
County, Utah. (R. 595). 
2. Mapleton City is a municipal corporation and political subdivision of the 
State of Utah. It is incorporated as a city of the third class and has adopted a six-member 
council form of government whereby the mayor and council form a unified governing body 
that jointly exercises both legislative and executive powers. (R. 595). 
3. Wendell and Trudy Gibby and MCBRS, LLC, own approximately 118 acres 
of land along a small portion of the east bench of Mapleton City which has historically 
been zoned as Critical Environmental (CE-1) pursuant to Chapter 18.30 of the Mapleton City 
Code. (R.595-94). 
4. The CE-1 zone classification allows reasonable residential development of 
property taking into account the unique features and characteristics of such property. (R. 
594). 
5. Over the past several years Mapleton and Gibby have been embroiled in 
several lawsuits over the development and use of the Gibby Property. For instance, 
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Mapleton has sued Gibby for a declaration that a certain trail which transverses the Gibby 
Property is a public right of way, and in the alternative, Mapleton sued Gibby to 
condemn the trail for public use. Mapleton also sought to condemn an easement for a 
water main across the Gibby Property. Gibby's lawsuits against the City include, among 
other things, a federal case alleging violation of his civil rights and a suit challenging the 
City's denial of his requests to re-zone the Gibby Property to something other than CE-
l.(R. 594). 
6. On May 15, 2007, after Mapleton had adopted a resolution approving such an 
agreement, Mapleton and Gibby entered into an agreement captioned "Memorandum of 
Understanding to Settle Pending Litigation and all Claims Known and Unknown" 
("MOU"). The MOU was intended to resolve all pending legislative efforts and the 
ongoing litigation between the parties. (R. 594). 
7. The MOU outlined the framework for a proposed re-zone of the Gibby 
Property. It also provided that, at no cost to the City, "the Gibby Parties agree to provide 
an easement for a trail from the north and south property lines of the Gibby Parties1 
property across the west escarpment of the property . . . ." The MOU also provided that 
"the Gibby Parties will grant an easement, at no cost to the City, for its water main." It also 
provided that the City will widen Dogwood Drive at the City's expense. (R. 594). 
8. Thereafter, the City staff made various changes to the text of the ordinance 
as set forth at the July 17, 2007, City Council meeting. An updated draft of the ordinance 
was brought to the City Council for ratification at the Council's regularly scheduled August 
21, 2007, meeting. After much discussion, the City Council voted 3-2 to approve the 
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proposed text of the PD-2 ordinance. This action effectively amended the existing 
development code to enact a new zoning designation entitled Planned Development-2 
("PD-2" zone). The ordinance was designated as Mapleton Ordinance 2007-17. Although 
the PD-2 zone was created, it had yet to be applied to the Gibby Property. (R. 593-92). 
9. Also during the August 21, 2007, City Council meeting, the Council 
unanimously voted to amend the Land Use Element of the City's overall General Plan. (R. 
592). 
10. During the "public comment" portion of the August 21, 2007, City Council 
meeting, Appellants notified Gibby, the City Council, and Mapleton Mayor Jim Brady that 
Appellants and others opposed to the new PD-2 ordinance planned to file an application for 
referendum petition. (R. 592). 
11. On August 23, 2007, the Gibby Parties pursued an application before the 
Mapleton Planning Commission to rezone the Gibby Property from CE-1 to the PD-2 Zone. 
The Planning Commission voted to give an unfavorable recommendation to the City 
Council regarding Gibby's request. (R. 592). 
12. Gibby's rezone application and request came before the City Council on 
September 18, 2007, at a regularly scheduled meeting, and was unanimously approved 
subject to numerous conditions, including, but not limited to, final plat approval of 
Intervenors1 proposed subdivision. (R. 592). 
13. On September 18, 2007, Appellants requested referendum applications from 
the City. Appellants subsequently circulated the referendum petitions to various residents, 
and timely filed their original referendum petitions with the County Clerk (with copies to 
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the City Recorder) on October 5, 2007, forty-five (45) days after the enactment of the PD-
2 ordinance. (R. 592). 
14. Appellants commenced this action on or about October 15, 2007, and 
obtained a Temporary Restraining Order on October 15, 2007. (R. 591). 
15. On October 18, 2007, the Utah County Clerk's office sent Mapleton City 
Recorder Camille Brown written certification that 2,973 was the total number of all votes 
cast in Mapleton City for all candidates for Governor at the 2004 election, that "[t]he number 
of petition signatures necessary was 1,041," and that "[t]he total number of certified 
signatures is 864 which does not equal the number required by [statute].5' The Utah 
County Clerk's office instructed the City Recorder, "By statute, then, you must mark the 
petition as 'insufficient.'" (R. 591). 
16. After consulting with legal counsel, Ms. Brown and Mapleton determined 
that it would be best to refer the disputed issue to the Court. (R. 591). 
17. There was no real dispute among those involved in this litigation that the 
referendum sponsors followed all of the "technical" requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 
20A-l-60\,etseq. (R. 591). 
18. Testimony from the trial verified that the referendum sponsors met the 
requirements of Section 602, which requires that the referendum petition have a copy of the 
challenged law attached and that it contain certain warnings to the potential signers of the 
petition; that the sponsors met the requirements of Section 604 concerning circulation of 
the petition; that a large number of signatures were obtained by the sponsors as required by 
Section 605; that the sponsors submitted the petitions to the County Clerk for verification 
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of the status of the signers of the petition as required by Section 606; that the petition was 
submitted to the County Clerk on October 5, 2007, 45 days after the adoption of the 
ordinance which was enacted on August 21, 2007; and finally that the County elections 
office certified 864 signatures and declared that 2,973 Mapleton voters cast ballots in the 
preceding gubernatorial election. (R. 591-90). 
19. The evidence demonstrated that Plaintiffs obtained 864 certified signatures 
from a total of 2,973 voters in the preceding gubernatorial election, and that Plaintiffs 
gathered signatures of 29% of the registered voters. (R. 590). 
20. The parties stipulated to the adequacy of notice under Citizens Awareness Now 
v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994). (R. 590). 
21. The legislative intent and general purpose and policy of the original zoning 
designation of the Gibby Property, namely CE-1, are set forth in Mapleton City Code § 
18.30.010. (R. 590). 
22. The Mapleton City Code ("MCC") provides, in pertinent part, that Mthe CE-
1 zone includes those areas of the City which, as the result of the presence of steep 
slopes, soil characteristics, flood hazards, erosion, mud flow or earthquake potential, 
wildlife hazards or other similar natural conditions or environmental hazards are considered 
environmentally sensitive and fragile." MCC § 18.30.010 preamble. (R. 590). 
23. The purpose of the CE-1 zone was not to ban development. (R. 590). 
24. The text states that it is an attempt to "recognize and appropriately balance: 
1) the need for preservation of the natural environmental conditions; 2) the need for 
mitigation of potentially adverse or unsafe conditions arising from development activities; 
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3) the protection of the interests of subsequent purchasers and occupants; and 4) the rights of 
current owners to the reasonable use of their property." MCC § 18.30.010. A. Development 
within "the natural limitations . . . of the environment was actually encouraged." Id. § 
18.30.010.D. (R. 590-89). 
25. Torn Nielsen, former Mapleton Planning Commission Member from 1984-
1989 and member of the subcommittee that helped research and draft the original CE-1 zone, 
testified that when the CE-1 zone was originally enacted, its main purpose was to protect 
sensitive lands from the type of landslides Utah had recently experienced, to cover all 
potentially hazardous areas of Mapleton City, and to protect against various geological 
hazards that were thought to exist at that time. (R. 589). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
When they adopted the Utah Constitution the citizens of the State reserved to 
themselves the power of direct legislation through referendum. That power belongs to 
the people. After Mapleton City adopted a new zoning classification, the PD-2 zone, 
Friends, with the signatures of 29% of the voters of the City, sought to exercise their 
power of referendum. They were thwarted by the City and rebuffed by the trial court 
when it issued an erroneous decision holding that application of the Marakis factors 
confirmed that the action of the city council was administrative in nature and thus, not 
referable. This Court must zealously protect Friends' constitutional right of referendum 
and resolve any reasonable doubts in favor of that right. 
Fourteen years after Marakis, this Court, in Mouty, held that a zone amendment 
changing a prohibited use to now allow the use was a legislative act. In reaching that 
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conclusion the Court held that no Marakis analysis was needed because in Mouty, the 
council action was taken in a city with a strong mayor/council form of government and 
thus all actions of the city council by definition are legislative in nature. Friends asked 
the trial court to follow that precedent. If a zone change in one city is legislative in 
nature, a substantially similar zone change in another city, regardless of its organizational 
model, also must be legislative in nature. Differences in the form of government in two 
cities enacting substantially similar zone changes cannot provide a principled or reliable 
basis for different treatment. The trial court erred when it failed to follow the Mouty 
precedent. 
This Court has repeatedly held in the context of direct appeals of zoning decisions 
that the adoption of a zone change or a zone classification is a legislative act. This is 
because, in adopting a new zone classification, a city council weighs competing interests 
in the community, evaluates growth patterns and makes other similar policy judgments. 
Only legislative bodies can make major policy decisions for a city. Thus, adoption of a 
new zone classification is the making of a new law rather than the implementation of an 
existing zoning law. As such it is legislative in nature. This Court should adopt that 
bright-line rule. 
Marakis is unworkable because it does not recognize that the adoption of a new 
zoning classification is a legislative act. It also is unworkable because it does not provide 
individuals, cities and courts with an objective standard upon which to base a decision 
that a particular zone ordinance is referable. As an example, Marakis requires a trial 
court to evaluate whether a zone change ordinance is of such a complex nature that it is 
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not appropriate for voter participation. But Marakis provides a trial court no objective 
standard or measure for such analysis. In this case Friends asserted that the effect of the 
zone change was readily apparent and understandable by the general public because lay 
citizens could understand the significant differences between the two zones. Mr. Gibby 
argued that the matter was overly complex because it took sixteen separate geotechnical 
studies to determine that the property was fit for residential development. Because 
Marakis provides no guidance to trial courts on how they should evaluate whether a 
matter is too complex for citizen input, it places an undue burden on the constitutional 
right of referendum. As well, Mouty held that complexity is not an issue in a city with a 
strong mayor/council form of government. How and why should it be an issue in other 
cities with a different corporate model? 
Marakis is unworkable because it treats citizens of some cities differently than 
citizens of other cities. Marakis requires a fact-intensive analysis, which always is costly. 
But that significant expense only falls on some of the citizens of the State. Others have 
access to their constitutional right of referendum without that expense. While there may 
be cases where a legislative/administrative distinction must be made, because adoption of 
a new zone classification is the making of a new law, that distinction did not need to be 
made in this case and the trial court erred when it did so. 
Finally, the trial court erred in its evaluation of whether the general purpose and 
policy of the new PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and policy of the existing 
CE-1 zone. While the trial court should have looked at the substantial body of evidence 
that Friends provided including the City Vision Statement, its General Plan and Map, the 
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text of the CE-1 zone and the text of the PD-2 zone, all the trial court did was contrast the 
preambles of the two zones, the CE-1 and the PD-2. The many documents described 
above identified a policy for the CE-1 zone of limited development on the hillsides, large 
lot sizes and frontages and significant slope protections. The new zone retained none of 
these. The General Plan provided that PD zones should be located in areas far from the 
Critical Environmental land use area but the new zone is a PD zone in that area. Had it 
properly considered all of this evidence the trial court would have upheld the right of 
referendum in this case. It erred when it failed to do so. Because of that error this Court 
must reverse. 
ARGUMENT 
I. WHAT IS NOT AT ISSUE. 
Several matters are not at issue. The trial court concluded that Friends 
scrupulously followed all of the statutory requirements of Utah Code Ann, § 20A-7-601, 
et seq. in seeking the referendum. The trial court also concluded that the new zoning 
ordinance is not a land use law for purposes of the higher petition signature requirement. 
No one contests either of these conclusions of the trial court. Further, though the parties 
spent considerable time putting on evidence on material variance and appropriateness for 
voter participation, the trial court did not reach these issues. Because these issues were 
not decided by the trial court they are not the subject of this appeal. 
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II. THE REFERENDUM RIGHT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
WHICH THIS COURT MUST JEALOUSLY PROTECT. 
The Utah Constitution provides that "[t]he legal voters of any county, city, or 
town, in the numbers, under the conditions, in the manner, and within the time provided 
by statute, may (ii) require any law or ordinance passed by the law making body of the 
county, city, or town, to be submitted to the voters thereof, as provided by statute, before 
the law or ordinance may take effect." UTAH CONST, art. VI § l(2)(b)(ii). This right of 
the people to directly legislate is a right which our Supreme Court has held must be 
jealously guarded from encroachment. 
[T]he Utah Constitution vests the people's sovereign legislative power in 
both (1) a representative legislature and (2) the people of the State, in 
whom all political power is inherent. . . . Pursuant to article VI, section 1 
of the Utah Constitution, the people exercise their direct legislative power 
through initiatives and referenda. . . . Article VI, section 1 is not merely a 
grant of the right to directly legislate, but reserves and guarantees the 
initiative power to the people. . . . The power of the legislature and the 
power of the people to legislate through initiative and referenda are 
coequal, coextensive, and concurrent and share "equal dignity" . . . . 
Because the people's right to directly legislate through initiative and 
referenda is sacrosanct and a fundamental right, Utah courts must defend it 
against encroachment and maintain it inviolate. 
Gallivan v. Walker, 2002 UT 89 ffi[ 23, 27, 54 P.3d 1069 (Utah 2002). 
Although the legislature has a role in creating the enabling legislation which 
defines and gives body and substance to the right of initiative and referendum: 
In carrying out this duty, the legislature may not "pass laws that unduly 
burden or diminish the people's right to initiate legislation." . . . Due to 
"the fundamental nature of the right of initiative . . . , the vitality of 
ensuring that the right is not effectively abrogated, severely limited, or 
unduly burdened by the procedures enacted to enable the right and to place 
initiatives on the ballot is of paramount importance." 
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Utah Safe to Learn-Safe to Worship Coalition, Inc. v. State, 2004 UT 32 \ 29, 94 
P.3d 217 (Utah 2004) (quoting Gallivan v. Walker, supra). 
Within the last few months this Court again has expressed the fundamental nature 
of the initiative right (and its corollary right, referendum). 
The authority of the legislature to set conditions on the exercise of the 
initiative power by the people must be read in coordination with the other 
rights of the people expressed and reserved in the constitution. It is limited, 
as a consequence, to the role of providing for the orderly and reasonable 
use of the initiative power. It does not follow, logically or constitutionally, 
that the authority to set limits on conditions, manner, or time gives the 
legislature the broader authority to deny the initiative right to the people. 
Sevier Power Company, LLC v. Board of Sevier County Commissioners, 2008 UT 
72 (October 17, 2008) \ 10 (emphasis in original). 
In this case all that Friends has sought is to exercise their right to direct legislation. 
The City wishes to adopt a new zoning classification. Friends asserts that the adoption of 
a new zone classification is the making of a new law, and therefore, legislative in 
character and subject to referendum. Yet, in order to vindicate this right Friends have 
expended tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees and have spent six days in a 
bench trial and now are prosecuting this appeal. All for a constitutional right, an 
important and fundamental constitutional right. "The referendum right [is] fundamental 
to our conception of government, [and it] should not and cannot be . . . easily thwarted." 
Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder, 2005 UT 4 f 5, 122 P.3d 521 (Utah 2005). In its 
consideration of this case Friends asks that this Court remember the words of the 
California Supreme Court, quoted with approval in Gallivan: "[I]t is our solemn duty to 
jealously guard the precious initiative power, and to resolve any reasonable doubts in 
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favor of its exercise." See Legislature v. Eu, 54 Cal.3d 492, 286 Cal.Rptr. 283, 816 P.2d 
1309, 1313 (1991) (en banc). 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO FOLLOW 
THE PRECEDENT OF MOUTY. 
In Mouty, this Court upheld, as a legislative act of a city council, the amendment 
to a zoning classification in Sandy City. At trial Friends asked that the lower court 
follow that precedent as the facts of this case are strikingly similar to the facts in Mouty. 
However the trial court erred when it refused to follow Mouty. This court must correct 
that error and conclude that Mouty provides clear precedent that the action of the 
Mapleton City Council in adopting the PD-2 zone was a legislative act, and thus subject 
to referendum. 
In Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, 873 P.2d 1117 (Utah 1994), the Court 
adopted a four-part analysis to determine whether an action by a city council is an 
administrative or a legislative act. Almost the entirety of the 6-day trial in this case was 
spent introducing evidence on three of those four Marakis factors.1 As discussed 
hereafter, the trial court erred in its Marakis analysis. However, as an independent basis 
for reversal, the 2005 case of Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder provides contours which give 
guidance in this case and which demonstrate the trial court's clear, reversible error when 
it rejected Friends' request to apply the precedent of Mouty to this case. 
In Mouty this Court found that a city ordinance as to which a referendum was 
sought in fact was legislative in nature, the only post-Marakis, zoning related case that 
1
 Appellants do not and never did dispute that they had adequate notice of the city 
council actions rendering the first leg of the Marakis test a non-issue. 
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has done so.2 Because the ordinance at issue in Mouty was found to be legislative in 
nature and thus referable, and because the ordinance in this case is significantly similar to 
that found to be referable in Mouty, the ordinance here also must be legislative in 
character and referable. This is so for several reasons: 
Mouty, as the Court knows, concluded that in a city which uses, as its form of 
government, the strong mayor/council form described in and authorized by the Optional 
Forms of Municipal Government Act,3 held that actions of the city council by definition 
are legislative in nature. Yet it simply cannot be the case that one city can adopt a zone 
amendment and the zone amendment will be legislative in nature because the city 
operates in a strong mayor/council form of government, while a smaller city with a six-
member council adopts a virtually identical zone amendment, as was the case here, and 
the trial court properly concludes that the zone amendment was an administrative act. 
Such an outcome is neither legally tenable nor intellectually honest. Either an action is 
fundamentally legislative in nature or it is an administrative action. But the same action, 
taken in two different cities, does not have a different character by reason of the form of 
government of the council taking the action. To rule otherwise exalts form over 
substance. 
2
 After Marakis was decided in 1994, only two cases have found an ordinance as to 
which a referendum was sought to be legislative in nature: Mouty and Low v. Monticello, 
54 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2002). Low was not a zoning related case. 
3
 The 2008 legislature repealed the Optional Forms of Municipal Government Act and in 
lieu thereof adopted the Forms of Municipal Government Act, Utah Code Ann. § 10-3b-
101, et seq. 
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Second, as the Court said in Citizens for Responsible Transportation v. Draper 
City, 2008 UT 43 t 11, 190 P.3d 1245 (Utah 2008), "The determinative test in deciding 
whether an action is legislative or administrative in nature is whether it creates new law 
on the one hand, or merely executes or implements existing law on the other." Mouty 
makes clear that the adoption of an amendment to a zoning ordinance to change permitted 
uses for a zone classification that is site-specific is the creation of a new law—a 
legislative act. Thus, by the standard of Citizens for Responsible Transportation, in 
Mouty the zone change, as a matter of law, must have been the creation of a new law. 
As demonstrated below, the zone change in this case is virtually identical to the 
type of zone change involved in Mouty. If treating like matters in a like fashion, which is 
what the common law development of the law is all about, means anything, then the zone 
change in this case, as was the zone change in Mouty, also must be the creation of a new 
law—a legislative act. 
In Mouty the Court held that the proposed amendment to the zone category there, a 
change which would remove the restriction on big box stores in a site-specific zone, was 
the adoption of a new law, and thus referable. In the present case the zone change 
proposed by Mapleton City, as to which appellants sought a referendum, was the creation 
of a new zone classification or category to allow previously prohibited uses on a specific 
parcel of property and to remove restrictions on development in a site-specific zone. If 
amending a zone category to change a prohibited use to a permitted use is the making of 
a new law, then it follows that the creation of a new zone category to change prohibited 
uses and remove restrictions on development on a specific site also must be the creation 
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of a new law. In this case the trial court erred because it did not recognize that the 
creation of a new zone classification that changed prohibited uses to permitted uses was 
legislative in nature, even without reference to the four-part test of Marakis. 
As is demonstrated in the following chart, the zone changes in Mouty and in the 
Mapleton case are virtually identical. 
Mouty v. Sandy City Recorder 
Zone before zone change: SD-X 
Length of time zone has existed: 16 years 
Parcel size: 100 acres 
City size: 14,635 acres 
Parcel size/City size: 0.6% 
Prohibited use: Big box store 
Proposed zone change: 
Amend zone category to change 
prohibited to permitted use and allow big 
box store 
Mapleton Case 
Zone before zone change: CE-1 
Length of time zone has existed: 23 years 
Parcel size: 118 acres 
City size: 7680 acres 
Parcel size/City size: 1.5% 
Prohibited uses: 
No building in steep slopes and no 
significant development on hillsides. 
Proposed zone change: 
Create new zone category to change 
from prohibition of hillside development 
to allow hillside development and to allow 
significant development in previously 
protected area 
It does not take any imagination to see that the proposed zone changes in Mouty 
and in this case are nearly identical. Each involves a long-existing zone that consisted of 
a very large parcel, each proposed a change to the zone classification to change what had 
been a prohibited uses to now allow such uses. Given the controlling precedent of Mouty 
and notwithstanding Marakis, this Court must reverse the trial court and hold the zone 
change legislative in nature, and thus referable to the voters of Mapleton. 
Given this analysis, the question may be asked: but what of Marakis? There are at 
least three salient responses: 
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First, as stated above, it simply cannot be the law that the form of government 
employed by a city determines whether an action by that city council is legislative or 
administrative. Yet that is exactly the outcome from the trial court's Marakis analysis. 
Something besides form of government must control the question of whether council 
action is legislative in nature. Here the only real distinction between what occurred in 
Mouty and what occurred in this case is the nature of the form of government of the two 
cities. That cannot provide a principled basis for the disparate treatment between 
virtually identical fact patterns in Sandy City and in Mapleton. 
Secondly, and importantly, while application of the clear precedent of Mouty will 
obviate the need for a Marakis analysis in this case, the result should be the same. If a 
city council makes the policy decision to change the existing zoning law of the city by 
establishing an entirely new zone classification, that change must, by definition, be a shift 
in the then existing general purpose and policy of the existing zoning ordinance and also, 
a material variance to the existing zoning law. What existed before has been changed in 
major and important ways: in Sandy City a prohibited use on a matter of significant 
concern was changed to a permitted use in the zone. In Mapleton prohibited uses, 
densities, slope regulation and the like, again matters of significant concern, were 
addressed and allowed in the newly created zone. The clear and logical application and 
extension of Mouty is that the adoption of a new zoning classification by a city council, 
any city council, simply must be a legislative act, and therefore satisfies the framework 
upon which Marakis is built. That was what occurred in Mouty. It is what the trial court 
should have done in this case. In failing to do so the trial court clearly was wrong. This 
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Court should remedy that error by holding that the adoption of a new zone classification 
is the adoption of a new law, and thus referable. This can be accomplished without the 
need for a Marakis analysis. 
Third, as set forth in Section IV below, Marakis cries out for some modification. 
It simply does not work the way the Court intended it to work. 
IV. MARAKIS MUST BE DISTINGUISHED OR AMENDED BECAUSE 
ADOPTION OF A NEW ZONE CLASSIFICATION IS A 
LEGISLATIVE ACT. 
Faced with the cases of Bird v. Sorenson, 394 P.2d 808 (Utah 1964) and Wilson v. 
Manning, 657 P.2d 251 (Utah 1982), each of which concluded that changing a residential 
zone to a commercial zone was an administrative and not a legislative act of the city, in 
Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, this Court adopted a formula of analysis that simply 
does not work. We urge the Court either to amend or distinguish Marakis,4 
a. The Adoption of the New Zone Classification is the Making of a 
New Law That is a Proper Subject of a Citizen Referendum. 
This Court has faced the question of whether adoption of a zoning ordinance is an 
administrative or legislative act in two different circumstances: 1) deciding whether a 
zoning ordinance is referable, and 2) resolving a direct judicial challenge to the adoption 
of a zoning ordinance. The result has been curious. In essentially every case in which 
the Court has looked at the administrative/legislative distinction in the context of a 
challenge to a zoning ordinance by a direct attack, the Court (and the Court of Appeals) 
4
 Frankly, in our view, the Court should distinguish Marakis or modify its analytical 
framework and overrule both Bird and Wilson. Neither of these earlier cases can stand a 
rigorous examination, particularly given the analysis and result in Monty. 
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has held that the adoption of a zoning classification or the rezoning of a parcel of 
property is a legislative act. Cases which represent this view include: 
Bradley v. Payson City Corp., 2003 UT 16^11, 70 P.3d 47 (Utah 2003): 
There is no dispute in this case that the enactment and amendment of 
zoning ordinances is fundamentally a legislative act. Sandy City v. Salt 
Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 221 (Utah 1992) (M[t]he passage of general 
zoning ordinances and the determination of zoning policy [are] properly 
vested in the legislative branch") (quoting Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 
758 P.2d 897, 899 (Utah 1988)). The political nature of the decision 
making process underlying municipal zoning demands that the power to 
make such decisions be vested in persons who are publicly accountable for 
their choices. See Marshall, 141 P.2d at 709 (noting that accountability for 
balancing competing interests in zoning decisions properly resides in the 
"governing body of the city"). (Emphasis added). 
Harmon City, Inc. v. Draper City, 2000 UT 31118, 997 P.2d 321 (Utah App. 2000): 
We also reach this conclusion because the distinction between a 
municipality's legislative and administrative functions rests on an important 
principle: It is a legislative body's prerogative to determine public policy, a 
judicial body's job to interpret the policy, and an administrative body's job 
to enforce the policy. Establishing zoning classifications reflects a 
legislative policy decision with which courts will not interfere except in the 
most extreme cases. (Emphasis added). 
Smith Investment Co. v. Sandy City, 958 P.2d 245, 251 n.6 (Utah App. 1998): 
A city council acts within its legislative function when passing a zoning or 
rezoning ordinance. See Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 212, 220 
(Utah 1992); Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 
545 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah 1976); Nay lor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 17 Utah 
2d 300, 301-03, 410 P.2d 764, 765-66 (Utah 1966); Salt Lake City v. 
Western Foundry & Stove Repair Works, 55 Utah 447, 452, 455, 187 P. 
829, 830-31, 832 (Utah 1920); see also 3 Edward H. Ziegler, Jr., 
Rathkopfs The Law of Zoning & Planning 27A.04[3], at 27A- 35 n. 39 
(1997) (Emphasis added). 
In an apparent effort to explain the Bird and Wilson competing line of cases, the 
Court of Appeals in Smith Investment then said: 
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In Bird v. Sorenson, 16 Utah 2d 1, 394 P.2d 808 (1964), the Supreme 
Court of Utah termed rezonings 'administrative* for purposes of holding 
them to be unfit subjects for referendum. For all other purposes, however, 
rezonings in Utah are characterized as legislative. 
In short, this Court has consistently held, in all cases which look at whether an 
ordinance is administrative or legislative for all purposes other than whether an ordinance 
is referable, that adoption of zoning classifications is a legislative act. 
Then came Mouty. In concluding that a zone change ordinance is referable 
because it was adopted by a city council in a city with a strong mayor/council form of 
government, the Court for the first time faced the essential fact: adoption of a zone 
change ordinance is legislative. Why? Because it was adopted by a legislative city 
council. Yet, it is difficult to discover a principled basis between what occurred in Mouty 
and what occurred in both Bird and Wilson. In each of these cases there was an 
amendment to the zone classification. In Mouty the change was to allow big box stores in 
a zone where such stores previously had been prohibited. In both Bird and Wilson the 
change was to rezone property from residential to commercial. Yet there simply is not a 
logically explainable basis for the completely different conclusions. And, as noted 
above, the form of government of the council involved cannot provide such a rationale. 
Mouty can be explained and harmonized with the just-quoted line of cases. It cannot be 
harmonized with either Bird or Wilson. That it cannot be harmonized with Bird or 
Wilson is telling. 
In the language of Citizens for Responsible Transportation, "The determinative 
test in deciding whether an action is legislative or administrative in nature is whether it 
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creates new law on the one hand, or merely executes or implements existing law on the 
other." 2008 UT 43 ^ 11. Making the policy decision to create a new zoning 
classification is the making of a new law, not the implementation of an existing law, 
because what is occurring is the adoption of a significant change to the zoning ordinance. 
Such changes by their very nature involve consideration and balancing of competing 
interests in the community, evaluation of growth patterns and where growth should be 
allowed to occur, analysis of why certain areas are better suited to specific uses than 
others, and a host of similar issues. At the heart of this evaluation is the exercise of 
judgment: Should the city create a new zone classification? In making that decision the 
city council is exercising a legislative judgment because these are important policy 
considerations. To use this Court's language from Bradley: "There is no dispute in this 
case that the enactment and amendment of zoning ordinances is fundamentally a 
legislative act." 2003 UT 16 \ 11. Not "sort o f or "partially" a legislative act, but 
"fundamentally a legislative act." Applied to this case, the adoption of a new zone 
classification is "fundamentally a legislative act." As such it surely must be referable. 
The language of the Court of Appeals in Harmon City, Inc. resonates: 
"Establishing zoning classifications reflects a legislative policy decision . . . ." 2000 UT 
31 f^ 18 (Emphasis added). It resonates because this position is consistent with the long 
list of cases referred to above which have made exactly that point. It resonates because it 
recognizes the essential character of what a city council is doing when it adopts or 
amends a zone classification. It resonates because, at its core, it is accurate. And it 
resonates because, as this Court observed in Sears v. Ogden City, 572 P2d 1362, 1359 
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(Utah 1977): "The city performed a legislative function when they weighed the public 
benefit of the ordinance." (Emphasis added). 
Because the creation of a new zone classification is a legislative act, when the 
Mapleton City Council adopted the PD-2 zone ordinance it was making a new law, a law 
which properly was referable to the citizens of Mapleton. Further, such a policy provides 
the kind of bright-line rule approved by this Court in Mouty.5 
b. Marakis is Unworkable; the Marakis Analysis Must be Modified. 
In Citizens Awareness Now v. Marakis, the Court, in an important effort to provide 
a standard by which trial courts can judge whether action taken by a city council is 
administrative or legislative, adopted a four-part, sequential test. Yet that standard is 
unworkable and must be amended. 
i. Marakis is Unworkable Because it Does Not Recognize 
That Adoption of a Zoning Classification is a Legislative 
Act 
As set forth above, only a legislative body, acting in a legislative capacity, is 
empowered to make broad policy decisions for a municipality, decisions which include 
the creation of new zone classifications and which parcels in the city should be placed in 
specific zoning categories. Marakis, however, ignores this principle. Rather, in every 
5
 "The above considerations, coupled with the unquestionable reality that a bright-line 
rule establishing which municipal acts are referable, would serve the interests of both the 
electorate and municipal governments, lead us to conclude that all acts taken by a city 
council in a city organized pursuant to the council-mayor form of government are 
necessarily legislative and subject to referenda." Mouty If 36. 
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zoning case as to which a referendum is sought,6 the Marakis test applies and requires 
extensive litigation. Marakis is unworkable and should be amended because even in 
those cases where it is clear that a new law is being adopted, parties are put to the 
expense of a Marakis analysis, an analysis which can reach the wrong result, as happened 
in this case. 
Mouty and Low v. Monticello, 54 P.3d 1153 (Utah 2002), each demonstrate that 
cases and circumstances exist which render a Marakis analysis unnecessary. In Mouty a 
Marakis analysis was unnecessary because by definition the action of the Sandy City 
Council was legislative in nature. In Low, the Court concluded, based on prior precedent 
that "the decision to purchase or acquire a power system . . . is a purely legislative 
decision . . . . 54 P.3d at 1161. In this case this Court properly should conclude that a 
Marakis analysis is unnecessary if a new zoning classification is being created as a 
significant policy decision is being made by the city council. In making policy decisions 
the council is making a new law, not implementing an existing law. Adopting this rule 
would obviate a Marakis analysis in those circumstances when it really is clear that new 
law is being made. Marakis should be amended to provide this bright-line rule. 
ii. Marakis Allows Impermissibly Broad, Subjective 
Judgments. 
A second criticism of Marakis is that the analysis which it directs results in 
subjective evaluations by trial courts. Such evaluations lack the certainty and 
fundamental fairness which the protection of a fundamental constitutional right deserves. 
6
 At least every zoning case in which a referendum is sought that is not in a city with the 
strong mayor/council form of government at issue in Mouty. 
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For purposes of example we will refer to the fourth Marakis factor, "whether the zoning 
change implicates a policy-making decision amenable to voter control." Marakis at 1125. 
(We believe other Marakis analysis points, particularly the general purpose and policy 
analysis, also result in too subjective of a review.) 
This test, as Marakis notes, requires the trial court to determine whether the 
proposed change is "of such complexity that it is not practical for the public to give it 
sufficient time and attention to make a proper determination of the matter." Id. But how 
is a trial court to determine whether a matter is so complex that it is not practical for voter 
participation? 
This case demonstrates the problem. Mr. Gibby argued that the issue was too 
complex for voter participation because he had commissioned sixteen separate 
geotechnical studies about his property in the CE-1 zone. If a matter is so complex that 
sixteen different geotechnical studies were required, the matter must be too complex for 
the general voting public. Friends countered with evidence that the Mayor and the 
members of the city council never read any of these studies. (Tr. 734-35). Rather, the 
Mayor explained, they relied upon statements to them of the meaning of these studies 
provided by the City engineer. (Tr. 734-35). Additionally, Friends argued that the issue 
of the zone change had much less to do with what the sixteen studies describe about the 
Gibby property and much more to do with whether voters were comfortable with 
significant development in the Critical Environment land use area, whether they agreed 
with a change from essentially no development on the bench area to significant 
development there and whether a relaxing of the hillside protections was appropriate. 
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None of these issues are complex at all. They are precisely the kinds of policy 
judgments that legislative bodies make when making zoning decisions. Friends argued 
that there is a certain arrogancy in claiming that these kinds of questions are too complex 
for voter participation. But more than that, there is no objective standard by which a trial 
judge can judge whether a matter is too complex for voter participation. Finding of Fact 
# 3 6 demonstrates that this trial judge thought the matter was too complex for voter 
participation. It also demonstrates that Marakis provides no objective standard upon 
which to base such a conclusion. Rather, when considering this issue the trial judge has 
the essentially unfettered discretion either to jump on the bandwagon of the municipality 
or the land developer and talk about sixteen studies, or it can look at the heart of the issue 
being decided, as Friends asserted it should have done, and conclude that the matter in 
fact is understandable and one as to which a lay person should be allowed to express a 
policy preference. 
Because Marakis restricts the implementation of a fundamental constitutional right 
without any objective standard by which a trial judge can measure the appropriateness of 
voter participation, the Marakis analysis constitutes an impermissible encroachment on 
this constitutional right. In our view, consideration of the general purpose and policy test 
also is fraught with potential for a subjective analysis. This significantly subjective 
standard is unfair, both to trial judges, and more importantly, to the parties to a 
referendum dispute. 
7
 The second issue that the trial court must consider to measure complexity is whether 
the zoning changes involves "the practical exigencies of the operation of city 
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Finally, is complexity even an issue? Not in cities with the strong mayor/council 
form of government for in those cities, even if the matter has great complexity, the 
citizens are entitled to a referendum. This Court concluded in Mouty that it was 
"confident that the ability to exercise the referendum power over the full range of zoning 
matters acted upon by a city council organized under the council-mayor form of 
government will not wreak havoc upon the smooth operation of municipalities." Mouty 
at f 36. Nor should it wreak havoc in cities operating under any other form of municipal 
government. Mouty also made clear that there are other, restraining checks on the 
referendum power, including signature requirements and procedural requirements. 
{Mouty TJ 35). From experience Friends notes that the very short time periods for action 
also provides a serious, limiting check on the power. In short, having referenda from 
time to time does not weaken a city nor seriously impair the ability of a city council to 
govern. 
government." Marakis ^ 13. Said another way, will communities "be subject to the 
undesirable phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient and often 
arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal land development." Id. Evidence on 
this issue also was introduced at trial. Mayor Brady testified that in the nineteen years he 
had served the City either as City Attorney, City Council Person or Mayor, the City never 
before had held a referendum. Friends also introduced evidence that the Vision 
Statement of the City (Ex. 14, Add. 49) explains that an important part of the vision of 
the residents of the City is that they "are citizens who participate in deciding matters that 
affect us . . . ." and that they encourage "[a] general vote on issues with city-wide 
impact." Notwithstanding this evidence, in Finding of Fact No. 36 the trial court quoted 
the same Marakis language about the dangers of piecemeal land development. 
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iii. Marakis is Unworkable Because it Treats Citizens of Some 
Cities Differently Than Citizens of Other Cities. 
In the trial court Friends argued that Marakis is unfair because it is discriminatory. 
The Marakis analysis requires a significantly different effort to obtain a referendum from 
the citizens of some classes of cities and counties than from the citizens of other cities. 
Mouty and this case demonstrate the point. When asked to recognize this difference and 
the fact that Marakis places significantly unequal burdens on referendum sponsors, the 
trial court simply ignored the matter. That was error which this court should remedy. 
As the Court acknowledged in Mouty, the Marakis test is an "admittedly fact-
intensive analysis." Mouty \ 24. Another word which, in the context of contested 
litigation, always can be substituted for "fact-intensive" is "expensive". Unlike the rain, 
which falls on the just and the unjust, the expense of a Marakis analysis only falls on 
residents of smaller towns and counties, but never on people from the larger cities which 
operate with the strong mayor/council form of government. For them there never will be 
the significant Marakis expense if a city council adopts a zoning ordinance because under 
Mouty no such analysis is required.8 What's more, the playbook for smaller cities and 
In the field of quantum mechanics there long has been a discussion of Schrodinger's cat 
in a sealed box but no one knows if the cat is dead or alive. We know that the 
hypothetical cat is either alive or dead. But quantum mechanics theory is that, until the 
box is opened and the cat is observed, it is both alive and dead. Quantum mechanics 
aside, we know the cat is one or the other; it cannot be both at the same time. Similarly, 
in this case, the same action taken by two different city councils, cannot be legislative in 
one city and administrative in the other. In fairness, the same facts must consistently 
result in one finding or the other. Otherwise, access to constitutional entitlements is 
random, though we don't live in a random judicial universe. As well, it is unfair for a 
resident of some cities to have to open the box to find out whether the matter is 
legislative or administrative, at a cost of tens of thousands of dollars in attorney's fees, 
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counties which face referendum petitions is to immediately force the matter to court 
under Marakis because the companion of a threat of litigation is the reality of tens of 
thousands of dollars in attorney's fees. While cities feign confidence in courts and say: 
"Let's go there;" what they really are saying is: "Do you know how much this will cost?" 
Cities should be invited, through a clear message from this Court to accept that citizens 
can make or overrule laws when enough voters have a concern that they satisfy the 
signature requirements for placing a matter on the ballot. 
While, at first blush it may seem logical and appropriate to let courts decide 
whether a matter properly is referable, the simple threat of doing so creates the specter of 
significant attorney's fees. In this case it took six trial days and countless other hours of 
preparation to put on a Marakis analysis trial, all so the residents of Mapleton could 
vindicate their fundamental constitutional right of direct democracy. On the other hand, 
residents in Salt Lake City, Sandy, Provo, Ogden, West Valley City, and other large cities 
which operate with the strong mayor/council form of government never have a Marakis 
fight when they seek a referendum. This is because of Mouty. The result is a 
substantially different burden on the constitutional right of direct democracy in a small 
town than in a larger city; a burden that is unfair and discriminatory. 
What is the remedy? For this case the matter is clear. Every time a city adopts a 
new zone classification it is making new policy and hence new law. The Court should 
hold that no Marakis analysis is needed when a new zone classification is created or a 
while residents of other cities neither have to open the box nor incur the significant 
attorney's fees. 
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zone classification is amended. And, as noted in Mouty, it can do so without worry that 
the referendum will "wreak havoc upon the smooth operation of municipalities." (Mouty 
H35).9 
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE NEW 
ORDINANCE FALLS WITHIN THE GENERAL PURPOSE AND 
POLICY OF THE ORIGINAL ZONING ORDINANCE. 
Although Friends strongly asserts that the Court need not reach Marakis for the 
reasons set forth above, we move to a direct explanation of the error of the trial court 
when it concluded that Ordinance 2007-17, which adopted the PD-2 zone classification 
for application to the Gibby property, falls within the general purpose and policy of the 
original zoning ordinance. 
a. The Trial Court's Factual Findings Were Inadequate and 
Conclusory. 
While Friends are mindful of their duty to marshal the evidence pertaining to the 
trial court's factual findings which are clearly erroneous, and they have done so herein, 
Utah law is clear that "[a]n appellant... is not required to marshal the evidence when the 
trial court's 'findings are so inadequate that they cannot be meaningfully challenged as 
factual determinations.'" (Justice Michael J. Wilkins, A "Primer" in Utah State Appellate 
Practice, 2000 UTAH L. REV. I l l , 128 (citing Woodward v. Fazzio, 823 P.2d 474, 477 
9
 A second problem with the cost of the Marakis analysis is that, at a trial, referendum 
sponsors must put on evidence on all of the four Marakis factors. Our law provides no 
vehicle for piecemeal litigation. Thus, Friends spent six days in trial introducing 
evidence on each of the Marakis criteria. Yet, because of the Marakis sequential analysis 
the trial court v/as not required to reach the last two factors: material variance and 
appropriateness for voter participation. But if this case is remanded to the trial court to 
address those issues then these referendum sponsors may face the prospect of subsequent, 
piecemeal appellate review. 
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(Utah App. 1991))). In this case, the trial court's factual findings are inadequate and 
significantly impair Friends' ability to meaningfully challenge the findings. 
In order for the trial court to determine whether the PD-2 zone falls "within the 
general purpose and policy of the original ordinance [the CE-1 zone]," Marakis at 1124, the 
trial court "[in] applying this element . . . must first determine the general purpose and 
policy of the original ... zoning category" and then "consider whether the cumulative 
result of the zoning change at issue . . . falls within the general purpose and policy of 
the original [ordinance] designation." Id. As described above, Mouty called this an 
"admittedly fact-intensive analysis," Mouty ^ 24, in which the trial must consider "a 
variety of factors, including the plain language of the ordinance, council meeting 
minutes, the intent of the enacting authority . . . and any other reliable and relevant 
evidence." Marakis at 1124 (emphasis added). 
In this case, however, the trial court did not look at any of this kind of evidence. 
Its factual findings are largely conclusory, with no meat on the bones. While, as 
demonstrated hereafter, extensive evidence was presented regarding the plain language of 
both the CE-1 and the PD-2 zones and other documents and information which establish 
and explain the general purpose and policy of the CE-1 zone, there is essentially no 
mention in the factual findings of any of this beyond what appears in the preambles of the 
two ordinances. (R. 589-90, Add. 51). A great deal of additional evidence relating to the 
intent of the enacting authority was introduced in the form of the Vision Statement, the 
Land Use Element, the General Plan Map, and other documents and testimony. Yet none 
of this evidence is even mentioned by the trial court in its findings of fact. Simply put, 
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the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate. Friends should not be required to marshal 
the evidence to demonstrate how these conclusory and unhelpful factual findings are 
clearly erroneous.. 
b. Certain of the Trial Court's Factual Facts are Clearly 
Erroneous. 
Under Marakis, the first factor which the trial court considered in determining 
whether the city council's adoption of an ordinance is a legislative or an administrative 
act is "whether the newly enacted zoning change falls within the general purpose and 
policy of the original zoning ordinance." See id. at 1124. The trial court concluded that 
the PD-2 ordinance was within the general purpose and policy of the original zoning 
ordinance and thus concluded that the council action was administrative in nature and the 
ordinance was not referable. In reaching this determination the trial court made 36 
factual findings. (Add. 1-15). Friends do not take issue with most. But as to several 
factual findings, we do take issue. The trial court clearly erred in making those findings. 
Friends sets forth herein each of the findings of fact which is clearly erroneous and 
citations to the record and facts which support the particular finding. In section V(c) 
below, Friends will explain the evidence which demonstrates that the trial court's finding 
are clearly erroneous. 
Finding of Fact No. 8. Pursuant to the MOU, at its duly-noticed and regularly-
scheduled City Council meeting on the night of July 17, 2007, Mapleton brought forth 
proposed text for a zoning ordinance that would apply to the Gibby Property. The 
proposed new zone, designated as "PD-2," would allow Gibby to develop 47 lots on the 
34 
relatively flat, buildable portions of the Gibby Property, while retaining CE-1 type 
protections for environmentally sensitive areas of the Gibby Property, especially areas 
having slopes exceeding 30%. The PD-2 zone allowed for clustering of homes. Gibby 
also submitted for City approval, roughly contemporaneously, a preliminary plat of his 
proposed 47-lot subdivision. (R. 593, Add. 5). 
Friends only takes issue with the italicized portion of this factual finding that the 
PD-2 zone "retain[ed] CE-1 type protections for environmentally sensitive areas of the 
Gibby Property, especially areas having slopes exceeding 30%." 
Finding of Fact No. 22. The evidence showed that Ordinance 2007-17 created a 
new zoning classification with a site specific focus to accommodate a specific 
development and did not constitute a comprehensive change to the zoning statute. (R. 
590, Add. 8). 
Friends only takes issue with the italicized portion of this factual finding that the 
PD-2 zone "did not constitute a comprehensive change to the zoning statute." 
Finding of Fact No. 30. The purpose and objectives of the CE-1 zone and the 
PD-2 zone are similar. (R. 589, Add. 9). 
Friends only takes issue with the conclusion (not really a factual finding based on 
any identified evidence) that the purposes and objectives of the two zones are similar. In 
broad senses they are similar. However, with only a statement that the two ordinances 
are similar, but no statement of how they are similar, this finding is a completely 
unhelpful conclusion, not a factual finding. 
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Finding of Fact No. 31. The enactment of the PD-2 zone maintains many of the 
provisions of the CE-1 zone. (R. 589, Add. 9). 
Friends acknowledges that the PD-2 zone maintains some of the provisions of the 
CE-1 zone. They both apply to the same area, provide for residential development in the 
area, and contain certain provisions dealing with environmental protection. (Ex. 15, Add. 
51). But like Finding of Fact No. 30, this is a conclusion not based on any identified 
evidence. 
Finding of Fact No. 32. These similarities include provisions on clustering, a 
"buildable area" concept, and verbatim slope protection requirements. Further, 
Mapleton City maintains the ability to grant or deny permits in the PD-2 zone and the 
ability to scrutinize the development the same as if it were under the CE-1 zone. (R. 589, 
Add. 9). 
Friends acknowledges that this finding puts a tiny bit of skin on the bare bones of 
Findings No. 30 and 31. Friends takes issue with the italicized portion of this finding that 
the PD-2 zone contains "verbatim slope protection requirements." 
The aforementioned findings of fact are supported by the testimony of Mayor 
James Brady, the then Mapleton City Mayor; by the testimony of Cory Branch, Planning 
Director for Mapleton City; and by certain of the exhibits. Specifically Mayor Brady 
testified that the City intended to draft a specific ordinance that would be applicable to 
the Gibby Property. (Tr. 594-99, 616-17). He also testified at length regarding the 
similarities in the PD-2 zone and the CE-1 zone. (Tr. 758-64). Mr. Branch testified that 
he felt that the PD-2 zone was consistent with the text of the CE-1 zone. (Tr. 344). He 
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testified that the enactment of the PD-2 was consistent with the CE-1 in that its intent was 
to avoid development on environmentally sensitive lands in Mapleton by prohibiting 
development in lands with a slope of more than 30 percent. (Tr. 345). He testified that 
the PD-2 zone required a permit for any grading, plowing, excavating, cutting, or filling. 
(Tr. 347-48). He testified that the City was required to make a preliminary determination 
regarding erosion, flooding, or landslide concerns prior to granting a permit for such 
activities. (Tr. 348^9). He testified that the PD-2 zone was essentially a mixture of the 
City's RA-1 zone and the City's CE-1 zone. (Tr. 350). He testified that he understood 
that the language of the CE-1 zone relating to slope protection was repeated verbatim in 
the PD-2 zone. (Tr. 353). And he testified that the creation of the PD-2 zone was not 
meant to be a relaxation of development standards. (Tr. 368-69). Additionally, a great 
deal of documentary evidence was introduced and referred to in the form of Exhibits 3, 
4, 5, 6, 7, 104, 105, 110, 111 and 112. Mapleton City introduced and referred to these 
exhibits at length to establish the similarities between the original CE-1 zone and the PD-
2 zone. 
Finding of Fact No. 29. It has been established that through numerous 
individualized studies done on the Gibby property, many of these concerns have been 
alleviated and that much of the Gibby property is not subject to the same type of 
geological and geotechnical hazards contemplated by the CE-1 zone. (R. 589, Add. 9). 
Finding of Fact No. 33. Mapleton City Council Meeting minutes indicate that the 
consideration of potential geotechnical hazards was considered in enacting the PD-2 zone. 
(R. 588, Add. 10). 
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Finding of Fact No. 34. The Gibby Property is not subject to the same type of 
geological and geotechnical hazards as contemplated by the CE-1 zone. Studies taken 
resolved Mapleton City's CE-1 based concerns. (R. 588, Add. 10). 
Finding Fact No. 36. It also should be noted, this Court relies on Mouty in that it 
is "hesitant to hold that an unqualified referendum right extends to municipal 
considerations involving necessarily complex issues, as the resolution of such matters 
may be best left to the mechanisms generally employed by municipal governments." 
Mouty 1| 32. "If cities are to function efficiently, citizens must recognize that there are 
certain governmental areas in which the need for continual change necessitates an 
expeditious means of decision making. Otherwise, communities will be subject to the 
undesirable phenomenon of city government by referenda, an inefficient and often 
arbitrary system that virtually guarantees piecemeal land development." Marakis at 1125. 
Findings of Fact Nos. 29, 33, 34, and 36 all are findings that address the sixteen 
studies which Mr. Gibby introduced in order to demonstrate the complexity of the matter 
so that he could establish that this matter was not appropriate for voter participation, the 
last of the Marakis factors. However, because the court resolved the matter at the general 
purpose and policy leg of the Marakis analysis, and because Marakis is a sequential 
analysis, the court did not need to reach the issue of appropriateness for voter 
participation. Thus each of these four factual findings is irrelevant. 
Notwithstanding, these four findings of fact are supported by the testimony of 
Robert Gunnell who testified that the studies demonstrated that there were some 
secondary faults, but that there was nothing that couldn't be appropriately handled with 
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the offset requirements that the State of Utah requires. (Tr. 708). Additionally, William 
Turner testified about the many studies that Earthtec Engineering conducted on the Gibby 
Property, including where the fault traces run. (Tr. 789-812, Exhs. 206-21). 
However, Mayor Brady also testified that neither he nor the Mapleton City 
Council reviewed or read the reports prepared regarding the Gibby Property, but rather, 
were presented with oral or written summaries of the reports from the City Engineer, 
Robert Gunnell. (Tr. 734-35). 
The conclusion of the foregoing analysis is that there are several factual findings 
which are completely irrelevant, several that are so conclusory as to be completely 
unhelpful and not really susceptible to providing a basis for the trial court's conclusions 
of law, and only a very few with which Friends actually disagrees. As to those few we 
have marshaled the evidence. We now turn to a demonstration that the trial court clearly 
erred in its factual analysis. 
c. The Facts Introduced at Trial Clearly Demonstrate That the 
General Purpose and Policy of the New Zone Does Not Fit 
Within the General Purpose and Policy of the Existing Zone. 
Marakis asks the question, first, "whether the newly enacted zoning change falls 
within the general purpose and policy of the original zoning ordinance." Marakis at 1124. 
This analysis requires a comparison and contrast of the purpose and policy of the existing 
zone, in this case the CE-1 zone, with the new zone, the PD-2. More than that, however, 
this also requires a comparison and contrast of the purpose and policy of the existing PD 
zone and the new PD-2 zone. Because the PD-2 zone was replacing the CE-1 zone, those 
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two zones must be contrasted. And because the PD-2 zone was implemented within the 
existing framework of the PD zone, those two zones also must be contrasted. 
As is seen from a review of his limited factual findings, the trial judge based his 
conclusion that the new zone falls within the general purpose and policy of the CE-1 zone 
almost exclusively by reference to the preambles of the zone text of the CE-1 and PD-2 
zones. (Ex. 15, Add. 1-15). This evaluation was far too narrow in scope. 
While the court must consider what the CE-1 zone text says about the policy and 
purpose of that zone, by overlooking the significant, unrebutted evidence introduced at 
trial that explains the underlying public policy of the City's zoning scheme, the court, 
essentially, missed the forest for the trees. 
The City's policy with respect to development in the CE-1 zone is found in four 
primary sources, only one of which even was referred to by the court in its findings of 
fact: 
1. The Vision Statement 
The City has adopted a Vision Statement which explains the City's policy with 
respect to growth and development. (Ex. 14, Add. 49). The Vision Statement provides 
that the City retains "a peaceful, country atmosphere through rural master planning." As 
stated in the Vision Statement, the City n[e]ncourage[s] . . . [preserving the beauty of 
Maple Mountain," while the City ff[d]iscourage[s] . . . [development on the 
mountainsides." 
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2. The Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element 
The City implements the broad policy positions of the Vision Statement through a 
document which it calls the "Mapleton City General Plan - Land Use Element" (hereafter 
"Land Use Element"). (Ex. 1, Add. 16). The Land Use Element is an official document 
of the City, reflecting the growth and development plan for the City. It was adopted by 
ordinance and thus has the force of law. (Ex. 1, Add. 16). Coincidentally, the Land Use 
Element was adopted in its present form on August 21, 2007, the same night and in the 
same city council meeting that the PD-2 zone was adopted. (Ex. 1, Add. 16). The Land 
Use Element explains, in the first paragraph of the first page under the heading "Land 
Use Categories" that: 
In order to create an organized and beneficial growth pattern for 
future development in Mapleton City and for areas which have yet to be 
annexed, the Land Use Element includes desired future land use patterns 
and accounts for the impact the new development will have on the 
community. It is the intention of Mapleton City to plan for these areas to 
be compatible with adjacent land use patterns and existing zoning 
designations. In order to do so, general land use designations have been 
assigned to areas in the city . . . . Each of these designations is described in 
this section and can be found on the Mapleton City Land Use Map. 
(Emphasis added) (Add. 16). 
After this introductory section, the Land Use Element explains that it "has been 
developed to meet the following factors: 1. The Vision Statement and other citizen input 
opportunities which incorporate residents1 desires] 2. Preserve rural character while 
managing the growth in Mapleton; 3. Water Availability; 4. Sewer availability; and 5. 
Road availability." (Emphasis added) (Add. 16). 
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The Land Use Element then describes ten different land use designations and 
identifies the zone classifications which fit within each land use designation. (Add. 17-
19). Curiously, the PD zone classification only was deemed to fit within the High 
Density Residential and General Commercial land use designations and was not 
considered an appropriate zone classification for the Critical Environment land use 
designation. (Add. 19). 
Finally, the Land Use Element, in describing the Critical Environment land use 
designation, explained that: 
Development of sensitive areas, such as steep slopes, flood plains, ridge 
lines, aquifer recharge zones, fault zones and other areas containing 
geologic hazards will be avoided to the extent possible. It is the city's 
desire to transfer bench development rights to locations off the bench. If 
property owners desire to develop their land rather than sell their 
development rights, lots for single family homes should be at least 3 acres 
in size, in order to reduce impact on the land. Building sites should be 
located on geologically safe parts of each lot, and shall not include natural 
slopes over thirty percent.10 
3. Mapleton City General Plan 2007 Map 
The Land Use Element was accompanied by the Mapleton City General Plan 2007 
Map (hereafter the "General Plan Map"). (Ex. 2, Add. 20). The General Plan Map also 
was adopted by ordinance on August 21, 2007. It identified in a visual format the 
placement of each land use area in the City.1 x 
10
 Exhibit 1,1| 10 (Add. 16). Exhibit 111 demonstrates that development rights for a large 
number of parcels in the CE-1 zone have been transferred to sites located elsewhere in 
the City. Yet for Mr. Gibby's property the City is not encouraging transfer of 
development rights off the bench. 
11
 For reference, the High Density Residential land use area is a copper color and is found 
in small chunks near the far north and far south of the City and in a large area along the 
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Read as a whole, the Land Use Element and the General Plan Map clearly identify 
d ( uy purpose and policy to have any PD developments only in General Commercial and 
IIIJJJI I >i'ii^ itv KV^ulrnii,tl 1 mil iiM' in i1 in Mi 1 'ill I Mi il w 1111 lii I  mini u s e a r e a s a n 1 t a r 
from the CE-1 area. The two documents also demonstrate the policy of the un> - - ep 
significant development out of the Critical Environment land use area b\ use <*l the 
transfei : f de ' ' elopi net it i ights t : : th : i locations : f tl le Cit) Finall) , these two 
documents demonstrate the policy of the City to require, to the extent des dopiiitnl in I.H I 
occurs in the Critical Environment land use area, large lots with minimal hillside impact. 
4, ^ h . . . - i t •-. 
Section 18.30.010 et sea oi the Mapleton Or. * A ^. 
zone. (Ex. 3, Add, ^1X '! no trial iour! found thai the legislative intent and general 
]• i - - . .*-ic aiv %ci .*•;*. .-: . .i.-i. • On Mapleton 
City Code (the first section oi the CI -1 MV/ : I 
commitment to protect environmentally sensitive and fragile areas within tht, „U) „ ^ u; 
alLw dcselopinenl which balances the preservation of the environment with the 
protection of subsequent purchasers arid occi lpants ai id the i ights of c v:,i» > i lei s to i easoi lable 
use of their property, (Ex. 3, Add. 21) I o meet this purpose the zone also had as a 
pi n pose ei icoui agii lg location, design, construction oi w e^s and de\ clopment projects with 
maximum safety and human enjoymen 
public services and facilities and the natural limitations of the land and the protection of 
west side of the City The General Commercial land use area \< m red and >^ kk.ued 
along US Highway 89 as it passes through the City. The Critical I.n\ ironment land i.se 
area i^  tin* large tan area all along the eastern boundary of the City. 
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the environment. (Ex. 3, Add. 21). The ordinance then expressed the conclusion that 
because of the fragile nature of the land in this zone, special conditions and requirements 
would be attached to developments in the zone and that the requirements of the zone are 
the "rninirnum required in order to accomplish the purpose and intent for which this zone 
was established." (Emphasis added) (Ex. 3, Add. 21). Thus the City adopted, as a part of 
the policy and purpose of the zone, absolutely needed, minimum requirements for the 
zone. 
Jim Lundberg testified at length regarding the textual differences between the CE-
1 zone and the PD-2 zone. This testimony was largely unrebutted. In his testimony Mr. 
Lundberg pointed out many plain, obvious and critical differences between the two 
zones. Specifically, Mr. Lundberg testified that the CE-1 zone required that minimum lot 
sizes be not less than three acres; (Ex. 3, Add. 23) that building lots have minimum lot 
widths of 250 feet; (Ex. 3, Add. 23) that all buildings be set back from the Bonneville 
bench ridgeline at least 250 feet; (Ex. 3, Add. 24) that no structure intended for human 
occupancy may be located over a fault trace or zone; (Ex. 3, Add. 25) that no grading 
occur on the property without a grading permit issued by the City; (Ex. 3, Add. 29) and 
that all land having a slope of 30% or greater must remain in its natural state without 
grading, except the landowner could plant additional vegetation or sprinkler irrigation. 
(Ex. 3, Add. 30). He also pointed out that "[i]n areas having a slope of greater than 30%, 
accessory buildings such as barns [etc.] . . ." (Ex. 6. Add. 41) are permitted as conditional 
uses. 
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These are significant and critical minimum requirement . • v- • e 
general purpose and policy of the zone as set forth in subsection (E) of the statement of 
intent \ \ hich sei \ es as the pi eai nble foi the zone te xt V et, as is clear fromExJuln. arid 
lengthy testimony of several witnesses. me I ud i ng N. • !' - - • * ' * i 
and needed protections are included in the PD-2 zone. (Ex. : \ \dd s h 11ms, the court 
.... me general purpose aiui p*>ik\ ^ me PD-2 zone is 
within the purpose and policy of the CE-1 /our K simply is 11* »1 
5. ()thcr Evidence of the General Purpose and Policy 
W Ink- IIH1 pt MIKH \ sources oi tne general purpose and policy clearly demonstrate a 
purpose and policy for the CE-i 
evidence also establishes the purpose and policy of the CE-i zone. For example, when 
1 * . . . . . . * * a> panning commission, the commission recommended 
against rezone of Mi -i^K . 
\ olumes about the general purpose and ooliev of ihc «.L 1 *LQUC. Exhibit 28 is a staif 
rcp't I Inmil tin. city planning stall lo llie City Council for its SoptcmK* IS1 
meeting. In the repoit i 
thai 'hi City Council dom the icquested rezone, providing four reasons for its 
r t . : • . . ! , 
1. • li tins appeal> , ^u.. 
generally in a Heel in tins area. 
"~
l
 > pii.-jKTiy sun currently located K inc CE-i /one cenann .-
available lor development under seasonable guidelines w itlmut 
having to encompass the entire parcel for areas -hat do not hau 'iie 
same geological layout as the referred to "donu1 hole" portion c-i he 
property 
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3. Does not meet the General Plan. 
4. Considered to be spot zoning. 
(Ex. 28, Add. 29) (Emphasis added). 
The City planning commission, an advisory body to the City Council, concluded 
that the new PD-2 zone did not meet the Land Use Element and General Plan Map. This 
is a clear statement by an official City commission that the purpose and policy of the new 
ordinance does not fall within the general purpose and policy of the existing CE-1 zone. 
It also buttresses the claim that the policy and purpose behind the CE-1 zone is explained 
in other documents in addition to the CE-1 zone text. 
Even the Mayor disclosed in correspondence to Mr. Gibby's counsel that the 
hillside protections of the PD-2 zone "are culled out of the CE-1 zone. . . . Applying 
them to the land with greater than 30% slope is less onerous than it would be if the CE-1 
zone is applied to the remaining 60 acres of land." (Ex. 27). 
Finally, Tom Nielson, a Mapleton citizen who was a member of the planning 
commission at the time the City adopted the CE-1 zone, and was part of a subcommittee 
assigned by the planning commission to draft the CE-1 zone (Tr. 118-19), testified that 
the PD-2 zone is a significant departure from the CE-1 zone in that there was no 
provision for engineering studies or fault identification or the appropriate placement of 
homes. (Tr. 123). 
6. PD Zone Text 
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The PD-2 zone is a zone created under the imprimatur of the existing PD zone. 
Thus,, consideration of whether the PD-2 zone falls within the general purpose and policy 
< in I 11 in i 1" I ) / 1 i i u , • 11 <, 11 in • , in n i mi i in i (mi mi mi mi "> \ \ II 111 I in I  II in r 1 1 1 . 1 1 11 in 11 j.', e s h o u l d I u \ r h u t i 11 < I 11 < > I 1 1 1 i 1 1 e 
In the zone text for the PD zone the City announced a policy that the PD zone 
classification and the adoption of zone classifications under the PD zone is not intended 
fc i :ii ci u nstai IC es vv hei e dev elopn iei it is reasonably feasible under an existing zone 
classification and the PD zone is not available to increase densities or relax de\olopmenl 
standards flRx 105. \dd ^ x Notwithstanding this statement of policv ami •mrpr^ by 
t ! .^!:5 was prepared contrary to that policy As the planning 
commission concluded, the new zone was "ai I attemp t tc i e lax tl i„.e zonii lg i eqi lii en lent 
general' \v affect (sir) " (FA. 28. Add. 79). 
As well, there is no nue^.
 t .,.,,, <(iv \\t . , one signilicantly increased densities 
that were available undei t1 • *'! i •. • 
purpose described in the PD zone. In short, not , * >\ Iocs the PD-2 zone n< fit within 
the general purpose and, policy of the CE-1 zone, it also does not fit w ithin the general 
purpeso and n- .5 . 
In summary, the following facts clearly and unmistakably demonstrate that the 
P u ... zone does i lot fit "vv ithin eiti iei the CE-1 zone of tl le I *D zone. 1MM .ia . ii\ h,^ a 
vision that encourages presi-
de velopment on the mountainsides. In adopting a zoning plan, the City established land 
12
 The (T> 1 zone allowed densities of one lot per three acres. The PD-2 zone allowed lot 
sizes as small as one-half acre and an overall density of one lot per acre. 
use designations which are a statement of the policy of the City. With respect to the 
Critical Environment land use area, where the CE-1 zone is located, the City said that it 
prefers that development rights be transferred off of the bench to other areas of the City, 
that lot size should remain at three acre minimums, and that no development take place 
on natural slopes over 30%. 
The PD zone is described in the Land Use Element as being suitable only for High 
Density Residential and General Commercial land use areas, yet the PD-2 zone is 
proposed for placement in the Critical Environment land use area. Additionally, the PD 
zone is not intended for areas where development is reasonably feasible under existing 
zoning and it is not intended to relax zoning standards or increase densities. 
Against all of these policies, the PD-2 zone is placed into a land use area not 
previously designated as appropriate for PD zones; it provides for lot sizes as small as 
one-half acre when the CE-1 and the Critical Environment land use area required three 
acre minimum lot sizes; it skipped the salutary purpose of encouraging transfer of 
development rights off of the bench area; and, completely inconsistent with all prior 
policy of the City, it allowed construction of all but primary residences in the areas with 
slopes greater than 30%. In short, the court was way wide of the mark in its narrowly 
focused and erroneous conclusion that the PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and 
policy of the CE-1 zone. 
All of the foregoing evidence was admitted at trial, largely without opposition 
from the other parties. Notwithstanding its admission, the trial court erred. Instead of 
looking at this evidence as a whole, instead of looking at the large variety of sources of 
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evidence which Mouty says should be considered in this fact-intensive analysis, the trial 
court myopically concluded that the PD-2 zone fits within the general purpose and policy 
n l l l i c ( I 1 I . l l l l i , \ '• 1 Hi iffni n l III I III li il n l l u l l i a n n u l i l l t T P . |IH1*. f i u l l l a i U O I l g a 
very narrow subset of evidence, ignoring the vast whole of the evidence, all of w h ich 
demonstrates significant differences in the general purpose and policy of the CE-1 zone 
and the PD 2 zone ' 1 1 lat ei i oi ci ies oi it foi ai emedj ' fi om this Court 
In addition to focusing almost exclusively on the CE-1 /y\ *. ' * q 
nlso eonchirM tint the iniportan- pun isions * f ;Lc CT.} /xmc with respect to 
j:e< u • •. . j ..-:* .* i.gei JS me numerous studies introduced by 
I\ Ir. Uibby demonstrated that the Gibby property is not subjivl 'i \h snne is pi of 
geological and geotechnical hazards as contemplated in the (1 . I zone. (Finding of Fact 
n error n .IIM ^ irrelevant i< 
Marakis analysis of general purpose and polity, o) - \ - * * * >x-
ronrhisions the trial court rssentialh was bootstrapping its wav nasi a aeanmuful 
gepn'.il 1111111111. JIHI i1 »ln \ an.tty.is IIKIIMII tin Lii.il anal simply concluded, w itliout 
any analysis, that u[s]tudies taken resolved Mapleton City's * I -• k-isi . 
(Finding of Fact 34, R 588, Aikt 10). 
111111
 '' « MateitKTil 11K* I am1 Use Meiuenl and Hie (icneial Han Map each 
speak clearly and directly about the City's purpose and policy (or ileveloprrii' h 
CF-1 zone. The PD /one explains the policy for creation of new PD zones such as the 
1
 • * u- \ • .;ave no consideration to any of this additional evidence., 
Under this, part of the Marakis analysis the ti ial coi u: t is obligated to contrast the pi n pose 
and policy of the zone that is being amended or replaced with the purpose and policy of 
the new zone. But in making this evaluation, a trial court is not limited solely to the zone 
text of the zone classification at issue. Rather it must look at all relevant evidence which 
explains, expounds, and elucidates the purpose and policy of the zone at issue. In this 
case, had the trial court undertaken this appropriate and broader review, it would have 
reached a different result. It did not and this Court must correct that error. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision as set 
forth herein. 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
Appellants hereby request oral argument because it will materially assist this 
Court in resolving the issues in this case. 
DATED this ]b_ day of January, 2009. 
KIRTON & McCONKIE 
By: 
nthony W\ Schofield' 
ugene H. Bramhall 
A t  
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Christopher E. Bramhall 
Peter C. Schofield 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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